

HOW EXPERIENCE BECAME PHENOMENAL

“On the phenomenal concept, mind is characterized by the way it *feels*;
on the psychological concept, mind is characterized by what it *does*”

— Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind*, 11

Our aim in this handout is to fill out this picture a bit, and do some conceptual archaeology to explain why it is so widely believed: not for good reasons, as we will see.

I. General considerations

Our project is the *metaphysics of consciousness as such*. A bit roughly, the metaphysics of M as such endeavors to reveal the nature of M “on its own terms”, or pretending that M is fundamental.

The expression ‘consciousness’ is a bit technical and perhaps ambiguous. Accordingly, we will sharpen the question we endeavor to answer as follows: *what are the natures of experiences as such?* The question divides: *what are the structures of experiences?* and, pretending that experiences are, at some level, fundamental: *what are the kinds of experiences?*

The notion of the **kind** of an F is familiar and perhaps also fairly clear. Assume first that the Fs form a “natural category”: Fness is *essential* (in at least the sense that for any possible entity, if it is F it is necessarily F); Fness is *natural* (in the sense that it “carves the world at its joints” at some level: this is a weaker notion than that of *fundamentality*, or *perfect naturalness*, in the sense of being among the most basic ingredients of reality). Granting all this, let’s then pretend that Fness is fundamental.

We assume then that there is a “natural taxonomy” of the Fs, some properties G1, G2, ... such that

- the Gs are the ways to be F;
- Gs are essential fo their instances;
- Gs “carve things at their joints” (on the assumption that Fness is fundamental).

Then the Gs are the kinds of F.

Examples

The *atoms* form a natural category: plausibly, *being an atom* is a natural and essential property; the various types of chemical element in the periodic table are a natural taxonomy of the atoms: having one of the various chemical element types are the ways to be an atom; atoms have their chemical element types essentially; the chemical element types *carve being an atom* at its joints. Accordingly, we say that the chemical element types are the kinds of atom.

Similar points could be made about organisms and the various types of species.

The notion of the **structure** of the Fs is a bit less familiar. One thought: the kinds of F are natural respects of *difference* among the Fs, while the *structure* of the Fs is the natural respect of *similarity* among the Fs: a cluster of features such that to be an F is in part to have those features.

Examples

An atom is *particular* rather than *universal*; it is *substantial* rather than *occurrent*; it is *located in space* and *persists through time*; it *can be a part* of a molecule; and *must have as a part* a nucleus and any of its associated electrons; its *kind consists in* the number of electrons in its nucleus. Plausibly, having each such feature is part of what it is to be an atom. Accordingly, all of these features are among the structure of the atoms.

II. The content of the phenomenal state conception

The phenomenal state conception says:

Experiences are passive, local mental states falling into phenomenal kinds;

the phenomenal kind of an experience of seeing a red (green) thing is a property resembling or representing redness (greenness), and so forth.

The first clause here concerns the *structure* of experiences; the second, the *kinds* of experiences. The key doctrines can be broken out in the following way:

1. Perceptual states are *paradigms* of experiences; the kind of an experience of seeing color tracks and thus can be indexed to the color seen
 - This latter claim needs to be relativized a bunch: e.g., to a subject's recent history (so that there is no implication that every experience of seeing red has the same phenomenal character), to a given lighting condition, perhaps other things. It also needs perhaps to be weakened to accommodate very similar colors. It also perhaps needs to be complicated to accommodate for example perceived variation in lighting conditions.
 - To get a handle on the phenomenal character which tracks a given color, people have thought of it as either *similar to* the color (qualia theory) or as *representing* the color (representationalism).
2. Experiences are *narrow*
 - Which kind of experience S has entails nothing about how the world outside of S is, intrinsically
3. Experiences are *states*
 - Which kind of experience S has at t entails nothing about which kind of experience S has at times other than t
4. Experiences are *passive*
 - Kinds of experience are never kinds of action (this is entailed by (3))

(1) seems to strongly support (3) and (4): seeing a certain color is a state and hence not an action. There is perhaps a bit of conflict between (1) and (2): isn't perception a broad state? Well yes. For this reason, a better paradigm is *sensation*, such as pain; some effort therefore has gone toward characterizing "perceptual experiences" that are in effect narrow *parts* of perceptual states.

III. Chalmers on experience and representation

I claim that the phenomenal state conception is the current orthodoxy, an orthodoxy which bridges the gap between representationalists and qualia theorists. How better to exhibit this than by analysis of a widely cited paper which serves as a sort of linchpin of the discussion between the views? Namely, Chalmers's 'The representational character of experience'.

After a brief overview of the paper, we will see that it is committed to the phenomenal state conception.

- Reductionism and recent history:

The aim of the paper is to explore the link between consciousness and representation.

At the time of writing (around 2000), the dominant view about the nature of consciousness was the *qualia* variant of the phenomenal state conception. On this view, there basically is no significant link between consciousness and representation.

Nevertheless, certain physicalists (Harman 1990; Tye 1992, 1995; Dretske 1995), concerned by the alleged irreducibility of the phenomenal to the physical, had advanced the doctrine of “reductive representationalism”, characterized by acceptance of the following argument: (i) phenomenal properties are identical to representational properties (*being correct about the world just if p*); (ii) representational properties are in turn identical to (physically instantiable) functional properties (a la Fodor and Dretske). Hence phenomenal properties are (physically instantiable) functional properties.

Unsurprisingly, Chalmers rejected this reductive doctrine, providing the first instance of a now widely accepted reply to the case for reduction: the representational properties for which (i) is true might be distinct from any such properties for which (ii) is true. Accordingly, one could accept representationalism without having to worry about the prospects of reductionism.

- The interest of nonreductive representationalism:

But why *would* one accept representationalism if not for reductionist reasons?

This runs together two questions: (A) what are the arguments for representationalism? (B) why should we care whether representationalism is true if we do not care about reduction?

On (A) -- A range of arguments for representationalism had been canvassed by 2000: an argument from an alleged “transparency” of perceptual states (reflecting on such states, we find no qualities but perceived qualities) was quite popular: Harman kicked off the discussion with this argument in 1990. Still, the logic of the argument proved impossible to make out, and the central premiss was both rather strong, hard to formulate, and widely disputed.

The real case for the view though was that the implausibility of the *qualia* view became obvious to anyone who looked at it closely. Of course consciousness is not a meaningless wall of qualities between the subject and the world.

Chalmers sharpens this idea, appealing to argumentation due to Charles Siewert: reflecting on a perceptual state, we find that it makes some sort of claim about the world (without the benefit of further interpretation), along the lines of *a computer is in front of you*. Chalmers then exhibits a range of distinctions which, if we flip in the right way on each one, enable us to preserve this baseline judgement against a range of objections. [Note the strategy here: frontload the attractive picture, then formulate a sharpened version of the picture that emerges from the rubble and explosions.]

On (B) – Consciousness is interesting enough that it is worth understanding its nature, rather than merely as an adjunct to the age-old dispute over the status of materialism. Dualists, in

particular, regard consciousness as fundamental to reality, so that by inquiring into the nature of consciousness we thereby inquire into the fundamental nature of reality. “Type B materialists”—non-dualists who accept an explanatory gap between consciousness and matter—find themselves unable to form a full *picture* of the world in purely material terms, so that making sense of the world requires at least some degree of thinking with the dualist (even if more explicitly dualist aspects are eventually taken back by appeal to mysterious relations of identity).

- Representationalism a la Chalmers:

The version of representationalism Chalmers develops has the following core commitment: the nature of an experience of seeing red (green) is, roughly: *phenomenally representing some color under the mode of presentation [the color that typically causes me to instantiate phenomenal red (green)]*. Comments:

- Representing “phenomenally” is representing in a special irreducible way that is inaccessible to zombies.
- A “mode of presentation” of a color is something like the “aspect” the color is presented to you under, a property of the color which captures the *way* you think of or see it. Even if red is some physical property, you could be unaware of this by representing it under this mode of presentation. Representing under a mode of presentation is often called “Fregean” representation.
- The notion of “phenomenal red” is somewhat confusing: the nature of an experience of seeing red is supposed to *be* phenomenal red; but then that property also appears in its own definition. There is some desire to discriminate the property appearing in the definition from the defined property—perhaps by thinking of the former as a traditional “quale”. And yet Chalmers seems to want to reject this approach. Perhaps for our purposes doing so will be harmless.
- Why the appeal to Fregean representation? We saw above that doctrines (1) and (2) of the phenomenal state conception are in some conflict, because perception is not narrow; as a result friends of the phenomenal state conception have sought narrow “perceptual experiences” that are *parts* of perceptual states. Fregean representation as traditionally understood (and as developed technically by Chalmers elsewhere) *is* narrow. This appeal, therefore, is Chalmers’s effort at resolving this conflict.

IV. Chalmers and the phenomenal state conception

The claim now is that Chalmers endorses or is committed to doctrines (1)—(4) of the phenomenal state conception. Doctrines (1) and (2) are accepted explicitly, while (3) and (4) can be argued to be implicit commitments.

Geeky sidebar

At least a bit of artistry is involved in interpreting Chalmers due to a mismatch between our apparatus and Chalmers’s. The difficulty is that his “experiences” seem to be “tropes”—token instantiations of properties by substantial particulars—rather than our occurrent particulars. (At the same time, the difference here is a rather subtle one: as we will see in segment 2, the metaphysical credentials of states are a bit weaker than those of events.)

For many purposes it does not make much difference whether one focuses on the phenomenal properties of subjects or of mental states (it is easy to translate between the two ways of talking), and in what follows I will move back and forth between them.

Accordingly, phenomenal properties for Chalmers are properties of *subjects* rather than of *experiences*. So we need to (a) inject genuine occurrent particulars into the Chalmers framework and (b) rejigger his phenomenal characters as properties of these particulars.

I propose the following translation schema:

at least one of *S*'s experiences at *t* is of kind *K* ≡

at *t*, *S* is *K'*

Where *K'* is some (non-kind) property of subjects duly related to *K*, a kind of experience.

Accordingly, the claim that a case of seeing a red thing is an experience can be recast as the claim that when one sees a red thing, one thereby has some phenomenal character; the claim that phenomenal red is the kind of such cases (in me) as the claim that phenomenal red is my kind when I see a red thing; the claim that experiences are *states* could be interpreted as the claim that having a certain phenomenal character at *t* makes no demands on which phenomenal character one has at other times; the claim that experiences are *local* as the claim that a subject's phenomenal character at *t* supervenes on the intrinsic nature of the subject at *t*; and the claim that experiences are *passive* as the claim that phenomenal characters are not properties of the form *performing action A*.

This is fine for present purposes but other claims that can be made in our framework cannot be interpreted without further specification: e.g., the claim that one of my current experiences has been going on for six years and another has been going on for only one minute, or the claim that *e* is part of *e'* but not of *e''*.

1. Perceptual states are paradigms of experiences; the phenomenal character of a state of seeing color tracks and thus can be indexed by the color

This commitment (duly weakened) is fairly obvious:

phenomenal properties [...] characterize [...] what it is like to be in a mental state (what it is like to see **a certain shade of green**, for example, or what it is like to feel a certain sharp pain).

a phenomenal property (having an experience with the phenomenal character as of seeing something X-shaped) entails a pure representational property (roughly, representing that there is an object with a certain shape in the world).

Something similar plausibly applies to other visual experiences, such as experiences of position and of color, and to other perceptual experiences, such as auditory and tactile experiences.

Let us say that *phenomenal redness* is the phenomenal property typically associated in our community with seeing red things. (Phenomenal redness should be distinguished from ordinary redness: the first is a property of experiences or of subjects, the second is a property of objects in one's environment.)

it is hard to know what an indeterminate phenomenal state involving both phenomenal red and phenomenal green could be like

it seems possible that in counterfactual circumstances, red objects might be disposed to cause phenomenally green experiences in normal observers, or in me

for a property (say, greenness) to be attributed by the experience, it must be the property that has usually caused that sort of color experience in normal conditions in the past. So the mode of

presentation of the property will be something like: *the property that usually causes phenomenally green experiences in normal conditions*

2. Experiences are narrow

Once again, completely explicit:

Even a brain in a vat that has experiences that are phenomenally identical to mine will ...

It is widely believed that phenomenal properties depend only on the internal state of the subject.

The wide representationalist strategy is even more counterintuitive, entailing that what it is like to be a subject depends constitutively on factors that may be far away from the subject and in the distant past.

The view I have defended is ... narrow

Two comments:

(i) Granting the attractiveness of the belief that phenomenal properties are narrow, this claim entails that experiences are narrow only if the phenomenal state conception is true.

(ii) Chalmers has a good argument against this “wide representationalist strategy”, at which we should take a look to assess whether it establishes that experiences are narrow.

Wide representationalism, let’s say, is the view that (a) two experiences are alike in the representational properties that equate with color-vision phenomenal properties just if the colors represented in those experiences are alike (b) for S’s experience of a given nonrepresentational type N to represent C is for S’s Ns to be typically caused by C.

The case against wide representationalism runs as follows:

- It is possible for the color by which S’s Ns are typically caused to shift over time. For instance, in 1990, S’s Rs are typically caused by red, while in 2000 they are typically caused by green. But this happens slowly, with the shift starting in 1991 and not ending until 1999. Somewhere in the middle, say June 1995, it is not at all clear which color is the “typical” cause of S’s Rs.

So consider three of S’s Rs, R1 (in 1990), R2 (in June ’95), and R3 (in 2000). R1 is clearly phenomenal red, and R3 is clearly phenomenal green. Now ask: is R2 of the same phenomenal type as R1, or as R3? By (b), it is not clear whether R2 represents red or green. So by (a), it is not clear whether R2 is of the same phenomenal type as R1 or as R3.

But that is absurd. It makes no sense to think of an experience for which it is unclear whether it is phenomenal red or phenomenal green.

The argument does not undermine the claim that experiential kinds are broad unless experiential kinds are phenomenal kinds. Even granting this, we might think that phenomenal kinds are sometimes constituted by (or identical to) perceptual state types, which in turn are relations of acquaintance with features in the here and now. This view is externalist but it is a “localist” rather than “globalist”

externalism, because it is “relationist” rather than representationalist. Accordingly there is nothing plausibly “gradual” that could get a vagueness objection going.

So experiential kinds can be broad either if they are not phenomenal kinds or if phenomenal kinds are not representational kinds.

3. Experiences are states

It’s not enough to point out that Chalmers *says* this, because (a) terminology concerning occurrences is in general loose and (b) for reasons discussed in the geeky sidebar, he doesn’t mean the same thing by either ‘experience’ or ‘state’ as we do.

Still, arguments for this interpretation can be given.

- A. As discussed in the geeky sidebar, Chalmers is willing to trade in talk of my t-experience having a certain phenomenal property for talk of *me* having a certain phenomenal property at t. This suggests that he is thinking of experiences as something like “tropes” or “property-instances”. On standard metaphysical views, the only essential features of these things are the instancing subject, the time of instantiation, and which property is instanced. Events have richer essences, as we will see in the next segment; “states” as discussed in the literature on occurrences tend not to.
- B. Phenomenal properties are equivalent to (thus entailed by and entailing) certain representational properties, such as *phenomenally representing that p*. Now, *representing that p* can be seen to be stative (argument: *believing that p* is stative, and entails *representing that p*; anything entailed by a property with no entailments about other times is also lacking in such entailments). Could doing so *phenomenally* be nonstative? If not, neither could any phenomenal property (otherwise one would have entailments that the other lacks, an impossibility). And it can’t, as the geeky sidebar below argues.

Geeky Sidebar

In the next segment we will get more into the metaphysics of occurrences, at which point the following will become comprehensible.

An F-occurrence could be nonstative only if either (a) it can’t last for only an instant, or (b) it marks the onset or conclusion of some more fundamental occurrence.

Which sort would nonstative occurrences of phenomenally representing that p be?

Clearly not of sort (b): experiences are fundamental entities.

The case that they could not be of sort (a) is a bit more laborious.

The basic premisses are that (i) seeing an F scene are stative (ii) for each “normal context” N and variety of scene F, there is some p such that for one in N, *seeing an F scene* entails *phenomenally representing that p*.

So if, in accord with (i), *seeing an F scene now* does not entail *phenomenally representing that p later*, this is only in the sense that as N varies, so does the p for which *seeing an F scene now* entails *phenomenally representing that p later*. As it were, if *seeing an F scene* is “N-relatively” nonstative, a weaker notion than nonstativity compatible with stativity.

But we don’t think of *seeing an F scene* in this way: our sense of the stativity of *seeing an F scene* results from our own normal context-bound condition: the property is therefore, for a broad class of N, N-relatively stative. Accordingly, so must *phenomenally representing that p* be, for the relevant class of p.

We are not home free because this is compatible with there being *some p* for which *phenomenally representing that p* is nonstative. But this would require *phenomenally* to “look inward” to the content of the representation it modifies. It is unclear exactly how *phenomenally*

is to be thought of, but if all it does is “turn on the lights”, it is hard to see how it could have sufficient structure to accomplish this.

- C. It is a nice question whether there is pressure to move from the case for spatial narrowness to temporal narrowness (in effect, stativity). Not obviously: the core premiss was not that phenomenality can't have *any* “fuzz”, but that it can't have as much as is required by broad representationalism.

4. Experiences are passive

Once again, I think there is an implicit commitment to this doctrine.

- A. It is entailed by the previous doctrine.
- B. Actions are absent from any of the present discussion, or for that matter, the “catalog of conscious experiences” at the top of *The Conscious Mind*—indeed, not long after it is claimed that “on the phenomenal concept, mind is characterized by the way it *feels*; on the psychological concept, mind is characterized by what it *does*”.
- C. An independent argument — positing this commitment explains a puzzling passage:

Shifts in attention clearly make a phenomenal difference to visual experiences. In typical cases, they also make a representational difference: for example, shifting attention to a word may lead one to represent the shapes of its letters with greater specificity. But there are cases that are less clear. For example, one might look at two red pinpoint lights against a black background, and shift attention from one to the other. Here it is not obvious that there is a representational difference between the cases. There are various suggestions one might make in response, however. One might argue that the position or color of the light to which one is attending is represented with greater specificity than that of the light to which one is not attending. Or one might argue that the light to which one is attending is represented as being more salient than the other light. Here it is not completely clear what sort of property “salience” is, but it is plausible that there is such a property (though it may be relative to a subject at a time), and the suggestion that it is represented in attention seems reasonably apt to the phenomenology.

Chalmers's story is not really plausible. If he were correct, alterations in “salience” would seem to be on a par with alterations in illumination: they would merely “pop up”, as alterations in the external mind-independent world. Of course that is not how it is: rather, I have a sense of agency in shifts of attention, that I am *shifting* attention. Commitment to the passivity doctrine could explain why the implausible story is given.

The most natural treatment of the two lights case would seem rather to be that the difference in what the pre- and post-shift experiences are like consists in a difference in what I am *doing*: first I am “attending to” the light on the left, then I “attending to” the light on the right. But this is incompatible with the passivity doctrine.

An alternative remains: why not impurify here? First I *attentively* represent that the left light is red and *inattentively* represent that the right light is red, then *attentively* represent the right light and *inattentively* represent the left light. But it is plausible that anything which happens attentively is an action: the impurified story would have to treat representing as something I do. This is *prima facie* implausible, and in any case incompatible with the passivity doctrine.

V. Chalmers to Lewis, and the Argument from Revelation

It is now time to engage in some conceptual archaeology. My argument will be that one source of the phenomenal state conception is our engaging in the following line of reasoning:

“Experiences are occurrences of sensation and perception ... and occurrences of sensation and perception are clearly narrow states (well, sensation is narrow anyway and there’s gotta be a way to push perception into this mold as well) ... so experiences are narrow states”.

Occurrences of sensation and perception are surely states (narrowness is more contentious!), but why do we accept that experiences are occurrences of sensation and perception? The argument will be that this is *traditional*: the use of ‘experience’ to refer to such states took hold for bad reasons in a certain corner of the literature back in the late 1950s, and in the discussion to which this lit gave rise there has never been much reason to revisit the point.

Recall the four central commitments of the phenomenal state conception:

1. Perceptual states are *paradigms* of experiences; the kind of an experience of seeing color tracks and thus can be indexed to the color
2. Experiences are *narrow*
3. Experiences are *states*
4. Experiences are *passive*

We have seen that Chalmers endorses these claims, but why? While there is some argument for (2), it assumes representationalism specifically and the remainder of the phenomenal state conception more generally. And there is no argument at all for the remaining three theses. I claim (and will argue later) that these claims are in conflict with our ordinary understanding of experience. The task now is to provide a story of the genesis of the phenomenal state conception, with the aim of showing that no good reasons ever were provided for believing it and that its widespread acceptance is due to unfortunate turns of events.

Here as elsewhere, David Lewis casts a long shadow.

One of Chalmers’s central aims is of course to argue for dualism. That argument has grown very complex over the years and, famously, there is a big appeal to an intricate apparatus involving “modality”, or possible worlds. My sense though is that the use of the apparatus is to sharpen something like the following argument:

- A. I do not solely grasp pain under an accidental mode of presentation
- B. Any grasp of X is always under either an essential or an accidental mode of presentation
Hence, I grasp how pain is essentially
- C. I do not solely grasp pain (for instance) as physical (by which I include physically constructable)
Hence, pain is not physical

((A) and (B) correspond to the rejection of Chalmers’s “type-A” and “type-B materialism”.)

(C) is an obvious datum: if I did grasp pain as physical, neuroscience would be a lot easier.

(B) says that thinking about X requires thinking about it *as* some way it is: thinking of it under one of its aspects or features. The feature in question could be X’s *essence* or *nature*, but doesn’t have to be: it could just be a way X happens to be, that doesn’t have much to do with what it is fundamentally (for

instance, *that bulky thing over in the corner*). By way of contrast, one might deny (B) on the grounds that thinking about X only requires having a certain cluster of neurons buzz whenever X goes by. The status of (B) is perhaps in the top five hugest questions in analytic philosophy, and we're just going to grant it from now on.

Granting (B), (A) says that when I think about pain, I can think of it under its essence. To deny this, we would have to accept that I only ever think of pain *inessentially*. The best known approach to implementing this idea is that I only ever think of pain in terms of what it *does*. (Recall here Chalmers's "psychological concept of mind".) This doctrine is most famously associated with David Lewis, who in his first published paper, 'An argument for the identity theory' (1966), proposed that

LA. the definitive characteristic for any experience as such is its causal role[:] ... a finite set of conditions that specify its typical causes and typical effects under various circumstances.

Chalmers of course engages extensively with (LA), attacking it (plausibly) on the grounds that it "appears to deny the manifest" ('Consciousness and its place in nature')—for instance, denying that there even *appears* to be any hard problem and denying that zombies are even conceivable. He concludes, however, that "the debate [with Lewis] usually comes down to intuition The claim does not get its support from argument, but from a sort of observation, along with rebuttal of counterarguments. The intuition ... is so strong that to deny it, [Lewis] needs exceptionally powerful arguments".

Lewis and Chalmers also agree on (B) and (C) and for the same reasons (concerning (B), see the discussion of "modal rationalism" in 'The 2D argument against materialism'), and on the dialectical situation: for instance, Lewis has a paper 'Should a materialist believe in qualia?' where he in effect runs the argument as a modus tollens against (A) (hence for LA) despite accepting its *prima facie* attractiveness; according to his blurb of *The Conscious Mind*, "We of the materialist opposition cannot go on about how he has overlooked this and misunderstood that—because he hasn't. All we can do is to disagree about which way the balance of considerations tilts".

At any rate, Lewis is of course hugely influential, and a large range of philosophers accept a large range of his assumptions. So plausibly the current popularity of the phenomenal state conception is in significant part due to Lewis's advocacy of the view.

VI. Digression: dualism and the phenomenal state conception

Before assessing this claim, we should ask whether the status of the phenomenal state conception makes a difference to the status of the Argument from Revelation.

The short answer is *no*; a longer answer is that for a certain subtle reason, eliminating the phenomenal state conception has ramifications that are significant for pedagogy if not metaphysics.

Geeky sidebar

Obviously our question is of no relevance to the general framework principle (B). Concerning (A) and (C), let us suppose that a sensation of foot pain is a perception of one's foot instantiating PAIN—the annoying property one perceives in one's foot. We can then assess the premisses modified to concern PAIN. (C) remains equally uncontentious; and (given (B)), (A) seems vastly more plausible than (LA). (The same is true if they are modified to concern the property *being a perception of one's foot in PAIN*.) So the argument is valid.

Still, at this point there is no argument for dualism as being *actually* true unless it is argued that I *actually* instantiate PAIN. Maybe I don't really perceive this quality in my foot, but instead it's just a hallucination? Maybe in a case of "referred pain", the part of the body to which reference is directed lacks PAIN. If I don't in fact perceive it, then the nonphysical thing is not real: so no threat to materialism after all. (The position here would be something like Chalmers's position in 'Perception and the fall from Eden': the *qualities* given in experience are merely represented, and not actually instantiated; same with an "acquaintance"-like relation we seem to bear to these qualities in perception.)

I am friendly toward the quasi-Cartesian thought that I *know* that I am having experiences, so if the argument is rewritten to concern *real experiences*, this eliminativist reply would not work. Premiss (C) would remain intact as well. However, premiss (A) gets rather harder to state: pains and colors are "vivid" in a way in which the experiential residuum is not. A quantified version of (A) remains equally plausible in light of the conceivability of zombies, but specific examples are harder to give.

If I am correct here, we can see both why, if our overarching aim is to assess the Argument from Revelation, we have both no reason to abandon the phenomenal state conception (its status is irrelevant to the metaphysics) and a positive practical reason to hang on to it (speaking as if it is true makes life easier). Of course this doesn't add up to a good reason to accept the argument, given our project of assessing the nature of consciousness as such: this project involves pretending that consciousness is fundamental, and thus in essence requires us to ignore the Argument from Revelation.

VII. Lewis to Smart

Taking a look at a bunch of Lewis's papers, it is clear that he endorses the phenomenal conception. Examples of "experiences" include: pain (1966, 1972, 1980, 1994), sensation of red/seeing red/green/other colors (1972, 1988, 1997), tasting vegemite (1983, 1988, 1995), smelling a skunk (1988), being hot/cold (in various body parts) (1988), having a sweet taste (1995), perception in general (1997b). Each of these is a perceptual or sensory state, hence a state and passive; and context makes clear either that the experiences are intended as narrow (see 1997b on "ineffable, infallible, purely phenomenal content") or else that narrowness-status is neutral here. (Notably, Lewis 1988 discusses "what it's like to drive a fast locomotive on a cold night", providing in effect an analysis of this in terms of phenomenal states I would have if I did so.)

Where does this adherence to the phenomenal state conception come from? The ur-discussion of experiences is Lewis 1966. There we see the key claim in his ontological views about mind—namely, (LA)—presented as "an elaboration and generalization of Smart's theory that avowals of experience are, in effect, of the form 'What is going on in me is like what is going on in me when ...' followed by specification of typical stimuli for, or responses to, the experiences". With this elaboration, it is possible to improve on Smart's case for the identity theory:

we who accept the materialist working hypothesis that physical phenomena have none but purely physical explanations **must** accept the identity theory. This is to say more than do most friends of the theory, who say only that we are free to accept it, and should for the sake of some sort of economy or elegance. I do not need to make a case for the identity theory on grounds of economy, since I believe it can and should rest on a stronger foundation.

My argument is this: [(LA)]; but we materialists believe that these causal roles which belong [in accord with (LA)] **by analytic necessity** to experiences belong **in fact** to certain physical states [because materialists think only physical states in fact have any causal powers].

So, the aim of the paper is to make a better case for Smart's view than Smart himself made, by using some of Smart's apparatus of which Smart himself did not recognize the full value.

Smart's central aim in 'Sensations and brain processes' is to clarify the identity theory and to rebut a range of objections to it. At the outset he asks:

Suppose that I report that I have at this moment a roundish, blurry-edged afterimage which is yellowish towards its edge and is orange toward its centre. What is it that I am reporting?

...

There does seem to be, so far as science is concerned, nothing in the world but increasingly complex arrangements of physical constituents [what is increasing in complexity? the world? or our theory of it?]. All except for one place: in consciousness. That is, for a full description of what is going on in a man you would have to mention not only the physical processes in his tissue, glands, nervous system, and so forth, but also his states of consciousness: his visual, auditory, and tactual sensations, his aches and pains. ... That everything should be explicable in terms of physics ... except the occurrence of sensations seems to me to be frankly unbelievable.

Lewis's favorite piece of Smart's apparatus is deployed in his reply to Max Black's famous "Objection 3". The characterization of the objection is somewhat opaque, but it can be interpreted as running along the same lines as our Argument from Revelation. If this is correct, then Smart's reply amounts to endorsing (LA). Here's the relevant passage:

Suppose we identify the Morning Star with the Evening Star. Then there must be some properties which logically imply that of being the Morning Star, and quite distinct properties which entail that of being the Evening Star [this looks like principle (B)]. Again, there must be some properties (for example, that of being a yellow flash) which are logically distinct from those in the physicalist story.

... It might seem that this property ["being a yellow flash"] lies inevitably outside the physicalist framework within which I am trying to work ... by "yellow" being a power to produce yellow sense-data, where[datum-] "yellow" ... refers to a purely phenomenal or introspectable quality [in the sense, perhaps, that reflection can reveal its nature, a la principle (A); it's granted under Objection 2 that the nature isn't revealed as physical, a la principle (C)]. ...

Now how do I get over the objection that a sensation can be identified with a brain process only if it has some phenomenal property, not possessed by brain processes, whereby one-half of the identification may be, so to speak, pinned down?

... **When a person says, "I see a yellowish-orange after-image", he is saying something like this: "There is something going on which is like what is going on when ... I really see an orange".** [(LA)] ... Notice that the italicized words ... are all quasi-logical or topic neutral. ... It explains how sensations can be brain processes and yet how those who report them need know nothing about them [need know nothing about their *nature!*].

So what about this terminology? Although going by the *title*, the paper is about *sensations*, and Smart initially gets started with discussion of "sensations, states of consciousness", in the reply to Objection 4, he suddenly starts using 'experience' to refer to perceptual/sensational states (and continues doing so until the end of the Replies):

I am not arguing that the after-image is a brain process, but that the experience of having an after-image is a brain-process.

Since the reply to Objection 4 is largely a clarification of what the reply to Objection 3 *means*, it seems very likely that Lewis's usage derives from Smart's.

Geeky sidebar

Another of Lewis's 1966 papers, 'Percepts and color mosaics in visual experience', also discusses "visual experience" in the context of a reply to a Firth's 1949 'Sense-data and the percept theory'. Firth himself does not use the expression 'experience' to refer to states of perception, instead using the terminology of "awareness of"/"consciousness of" things, and "perceptual consciousness" (although he does cite several authors who use the expression in this way).

Lewis also discusses Carnap in a 1969 paper, 'Policing the *Aufbau*'; the *Aufbau* of course involves some extensive discussion of "experiences" understood perhaps along something like the phenomenal state conception; see also fn 5 of Lewis 1968.

Lewis was also involved in studying game theory at the time of writing; later we will explore the fit between game theory and the phenomenal state conception.

Another oddity: why does Smart confuse *states* of consciousness with brain *processes*? He recognizes the tension in Objection 5:

It would make sense to say of a molecular movement in the brain that it is swift or slow, straight or circular, but it makes no sense to say this of the experience of seeing yellow.

Reply. ... I am not claiming that 'experience' and 'brain process' mean the same or even that they have the same logic. 'Somebody' and 'the doctor' do not have the same logic, but this does not lead us to suppose that talking about somebody telephoning is talking about someone over and above, say, the doctor. The ordinary man when he reports an experience is reporting that something is going on, but he leaves it open as to what sort of thing is going on, whether in a material solid medium, [etc]. All that I am saying is that 'experience' and 'brain process' may in fact refer to the same thing, and if so we may easily adopt a convention ... whereby it would make sense to talk of an experience in terms appropriate to physical processes.

The reply is lame: it *could not possibly be the case* that a state is a process, regardless of what "conventions of talk" we may adopt; Smart's reminder that the ordinary "man" does not know which process it is is not to the point. That said, there are a pair of moves Smart could make here: (i) keep talking about experiences as brain processes but step away from the phenomenal state conception, (ii) stick with the phenomenal state conception but identify "experiences" with brain *states*.

VIII. Smart to Place

Given that as it stands, the view Smart is pressing makes no sense, why doesn't he make one of these moves? Also, where does Smart come by the terminology of 'experience' in the first place?

In a footnote off of the key question in the second sentence of the paper, Smart explains his "personal" aim in writing the paper: "This paper takes its departure from arguments to be found in U.T. Place's 'Is consciousness a brain process?' ... I hope that the present paper answers objections to his thesis which Place has not considered, and presents his thesis in a more nearly unobjectionable form." So the answer to the second question is probably 'yes' (and as we will see it is in fact 'yes').

Geeky sidebar

Well, “yes, to some extent” might be a better answer. Smart also cites Brian Farrell’s 1950 paper ‘Experiences’, appealing to (LA) to explain the “featurelessness” of experiences—why we can’t describe them. (Smart makes an error about the relevant page of Farrell: it is 178, not 174.) Farrell, notably, ascribes the use of ‘experience’ to psychologists, himself frequently setting it inside of ironizing quote-marks.

The answer to the first question is: making one of the moves would abandon the view he thinks his buddy Place is endorsing (for minimal benefit, in light of Smart’s concern with the Argument from Revelation). The answer raises a question in turn: who is confused here, Smart about Place’s view or Place about the facts?

So let’s take a look at Place’s paper. Up top, we learn the following:

In the case of cognitive concepts like ‘knowing’, ‘believing’, ‘understanding’, ‘remembering’ and volitional concepts like ‘wanting’ and ‘intending’, there can be little doubt, I think, that an analysis in terms of dispositions to behave (Wittgenstein, 1953; Ryle, 1949) is fundamentally sound. On the other hand, there would seem to be an intractable residue of concepts clustering around the notions of consciousness, experience, sensation, and mental imagery, where some sort of inner process story is unavoidable (Place, 1954). ... I shall argue that an acceptance of inner processes does not entail dualism and that the thesis that consciousness is a process in the brain cannot be dismissed on logical grounds.

This raises a question right away: why does Place think that an “inner process story is unavoidable” here? David Lewis doesn’t make any big distinction between cognition and consciousness! We will put this on the shelf until the next section.

For now, let us examine the discussion of the relation between inner processes and dualism. The widespread sense that the latter would in this case require the former is allegedly due to an attractive

logical mistake, which I shall refer to as the “phenomenological fallacy” ... the mistake of supposing that when the subject describes his experience, when he describes how things look, sound, smell, taste, or feel to him, he is describing the literal properties of objects and events on a peculiar sort of internal cinema or television screen, ... the “phenomenal field”.

Instead,

We describe our conscious experience not in terms of the mythological “phenomenal properties” ... in the mythological “phenomenal field”, but by reference to ... physical properties of [externalia] which normally ... give rise to the sort of conscious experience which we are trying to describe. In other words when we describe the afterimage as green, we are not saying that there is something, the afterimage, which is green; **we are saying that we are having the sort of experience which we normally have when ... looking at a green patch of light.**

Place accordingly *also* seems to advance something like (LA) as a way around some pretheoretically alluring case for dualism, the nature of which is left alluring: Place does not explain why we commit the phenomenological fallacy. (Perhaps the Argument from Revelation is running in the background: the language of “phenomenal” carries some suggestion of revelation of essence.)

Let us now turn to the question of whose confusion led to Smart's asserting that sensational states are processes: is Smart confused about what Place meant, or is Place confused about the facts?

A prima facie case can be made that Place is not confused about the facts.

- i. Place's title promises a discussion of *consciousness* rather than Smart's *sensations*. The notion of consciousness is unclear, so we should ask how Place is thinking about consciousness such that it might be a process. There is a hint that we might find the answer in 'The concept of heed', because that is the paper to which we are referred in the starting material as making the case that Ryle's view is inadequate. Note also that while Place mentions sensations and mental imagery in that context, they are mentioned merely as members of a "cluster of concepts" alleged to break the Ryle view.
- ii. Toward the end of the paper, Place characterizes "describing experience" as "describing how things look, sound, smell, taste, or feel to one". Plausibly saying how things look is saying what happens when I look—saying what sort of act of looking I perform. If so, there is no equation of experiences with states.
Relatedly, note a key contrast between the Smart and Place implementations of (LA): for Smart, the external condition referred to is *seeing* an orange, while for Place it is *looking at* a green patch of light.
- iii. (LA) is being used to give a sense of how psychologists should interpret the discourse of ordinary attempts at describing experience. While the example of such discourse is the state-claim "I have a green afterimage", Place leaves open that we communicate his version of (LA) by implicature rather than by an analytic equivalence.
- iv. I'm getting a hint of a sort of hard to pin down difference in spirit between Place and Smart. Place is an *eliminativist about the phenomenal field*, who nevertheless *accepts experiences*, identifying the latter with *brain processes*. Smart, by contrast, seems to *endorse* the existence of the phenomenal field ("the experience of having an afterimage is a brain-process"), identifying its states with both experiences and brain processes.

This is subtle, but we have already seen one difference to which it gives rise: Smart is forced to say that some states are processes, but Place isn't obviously so forced. Another is this: suppose that the theorist's discourse of the phenomenal field requires a certain class C1 of brain processes to be identified as phenomenal fields, while the discourse of experiences requires this of a certain such class C2. Unless C1 = C2, Smart is in trouble; since Place rejects the theorist's phenomenal field discourse, this is no issue for him.

Noting this eliminativism allows us to parry an objection to our interpretation. Up top, a central aim is as follows:

Statements about pains and twinges, about how things look, sound, and feel, about things dreamed of or pictured in the mind's eye, are statements referring to events and processes which are in some sense private The question I wish to raise is whether in making this assumption we are inevitably committed to a dualist position in which sensations and mental images form a separate category of processes over and above the physical I shall argue [no].

This could be read as saying that states of the phenomenal field are processes, and the doctrine of the paper is that they are physical rather than phenomenal. But first this ignores a subtle shift from the metalevel to the object level straddling the first ellipse: taking this seriously, the claim is that accepting ordinary language quasi-phenomenal discourse as communicating information about inner processes does not require inflating this to the theorist's phenomenal field discourse and in turn identifying its subject-matter with inner processes. In light of the

eliminativism about this theoretical discourse, we can see that Place makes good on this promise without ascribing to him the view that some processes are states.

IX. 'The concept of heed'

The two hanging questions at this point are: how is Place thinking of consciousness such that he finds it natural to think of it as a *process*? and why does Place think consciousness escapes the Rylean sieve? A natural answer to the latter would be that he sees the sort of counterexamples that lead us now to reject behaviorism — but since he endorses (LA) that can't be right.

For the answers we must turn to the bizarre, bizarrely titled, and rarely discussed 'The concept of heed', a true hidden classic of analytic philosophy of mind. (How rarely? The later article has 3,019 times the Google presence of this one.) (I get a bit sloppy about citation here, note)

1. Ryle and Repaired Ryle

CH is a criticism of Ryle's *The Concept of Mind*. (Conceptual archaeology inevitably hits bedrock there because Ryle's book has zero footnotes.) To get a real sense of what is going on in CH, we would need to get into Ryle in a big way. Unfortunately, Ryle's book is long, messy, and full of pompous rhetoric and bad arguments. Instead of wading through this we will consider a figure known as "Repaired Ryle" whose views are Ryle's views fixed up to remove some errors, internal conflicts, and excess commitments (in light of Ryle's goals and what is plausible).

Repaired Ryle's main aim is *epistemological* or perhaps *semantic*. His big worry is that mental discourse might be unavoidably committed to the doctrine of the "ghost in the machine". The idea here is perhaps that mental predicates refer to "unobservable" properties: we cannot perceive them, but instead the basis of our knowledge of them is some distinctive intuition in the first person case and a kind of inference on the basis of perceived activity in the third-person case.

Repaired Ryle's alternative to this doctrine is odd and subtle.

- a) A wide range of mental properties are types of external action: since these involve bodily movements in relation to our common environment, they are observable.
- b) Mental occurrences that do not instantiate observable properties fall into a range of classes:
 - i. Some are states of being disposed to produce external actions (or perhaps complex abstracts from such states): "cognitive" and "conative" states (beliefs and desires) fall into this class.
 - ii. Others are activities that are of basic mental types, the externalization of which is somehow suppressed.
 - iii. Others do not fall into either class; but these are in a certain sense incomprehensible and thus clearly do not fall into the core of mental discourse.
- c) The **adverbial view of attention**: attentiveness — "heedfulness" — is a *way of performing actions*—of doing things attentively or with heed.
- d) Consciousness/experience is the possibility of heedfulness; since anything that can be done can be done heedfully, consciousness/experience is doing things.

Examples

- Fencing (engaging in swordplay), writing calculations on paper, talking through an argument, looking at a red apple — all types of external action

- Feeling the character of a pain in one's knee — not strictly speaking an external action, but also in a sense continuous with looking at a red apple: the PAIN in my knee is like the redness of the apple, the only difference being the medium of transmission of perceptual information (nerves rather than light), which make it physiologically impossible for you to perceive it
- Calculating in one's mind, reasoning silently, practicing fencing "cybernetically" while lying on the couch — perhaps these are cases of calculating actively, talking thru an argument, or fencing occurring in the presence of some element suppressing the bodily movements they ordinarily involve
- Manipulating mental imagery, eg rotating a banana image or calling up the sound of a certain Beatles song to assess what some musicologist says about it — not completely straightforward what to say here, but (i) doesn't re-establish the "ghost in the machine" doctrine, as manipulating mental imagery is nothing like a narrow slice of action in the environment (ii) images resemble external objects and are in the first instance used as their surrogates, hence the point of this activity rests on a basis of ordinary action (iii) maybe a similar line on pain
- Looking at or brandishing a hallucinated dagger — (i) maybe a similar line on pain (ii) notably our only way of understanding these cases is via ordinary predicates which clearly do not apply to them: perhaps these are cases which are incomprehensible; if ordinary discourse breaks down here there could be no argument from them to a commitment to the ghost in the machine doctrine.
- Perceptual/sensational states — not themselves mental but rather hunks of the nonmental world with which certain actions constitutively interact (e.g., can't look at what you don't see)

On Repaired Ryle's view, consciousness is a process, but it is not a *brain* process. Moreover, the examples of experiences discussed in the Smart tradition are not experiences according to Repaired Ryle.

The real Ryle says things in conflict with, or which add to, Repaired Ryle:

- e) Heedfulness is defined dispositionally as a second-order feature of actions — roughly, if one *A*s in a way that makes this *A*ing more likely to succeed, one thereby does *A* heedfully (Repaired Ryle is neutral on this)
- f) Consciousness and heedfulness are identified (Repaired Ryle disagrees—note (d))
- g) Perceptual/sensational features are essentially objects of consciousness (Repaired Ryle disagrees)
- h) "Heeding *X*" is an activity of doing something in regard to *X* heedfully (Repaired Ryle thinks this is fine as a way of speaking but prefers to avoid it due to the potential for confusion: according to Repaired Ryle, what is done is "regarding *X*"—looking at *X*, feeling *X*, and so forth)

None of this obviously makes consciousness into a brain process either. Note that it follows (more or less) from (f) and (g) that perceptual/sensational features are essentially objects of heedfulness; and from this together with (h) that they are essentially objects of some sort of heedful action.

2. Place against the adverbial theory

Now let us take a look at Place's treatment of Ryle and Repaired Ryle. The main game here is to see (i) what Place believes (ii) whether there is a case against Repaired Ryle.

Place agrees with (a), (b), (d), and (g). He disagrees with (e) and (f); also with (h), the falsity of which would entail the falsity of (c) (because there would then be a non "adverbial" variety of attention).

Some of the claims are not relevant to the status of any case Place might have against Repaired Ryle:

- Everyone agrees on (a) and (b)
- Place and Repaired Ryle are on the same side against Ryle on (d) and (f)
- Repaired Ryle doesn't care about (e)
- Place gives no argument for (g)—merely the ad hominem that Ryle agrees with it—so it is not fair game in an argument against Repaired Ryle.

So to the extent that Repaired Ryle is under threat from Place, it comes down to the status of (c)—the adverbial theory of attention—and (h).

The crux here is in Place's section VIII, where as I understand it he argues as follows:

- i. According to (h), when one heeds the pain in a blistered heel, one does something in regard to pain heedfully. But what?
- ii. One possibility would be something like *regarding* the pain
- iii. But, according to Ryle, regarding X entails regarding X heedfully
- iv. And if Aing entails Aing Hly, it makes no sense to think of Aing as something which can be done Hly
- v. Accordingly, Ryle can't say the action in question is *regarding* the pain
- vi. The other possibility is something like *having* the pain
- vii. But this is also out, because having a pain entails having it heedfully
- viii. So by the same principle, the action can't be having the pain
- ix. Accordingly, heeding pain is not heedfully doing something in regard to pain, contra (h)
- x. And contra (c), the adverbial theory, not all sorts of heed are ways of performing actions.

Is there a problem here for Repaired Ryle?

No. (iii) is just (g), which Repaired Ryle denies. As I multitask, I shift what I am doing attentively between watching the movie, surfing blogs, folding laundry, reading a book, and eating. I am watching the movie the whole time, just for stretches inattentively.

Repaired Ryle also denies (vii): the injured running back does not notice the pain until he makes the touchdown; subtle aches go unnoticed during an interesting conversation.

And the merits of (iv) are far from obvious. Granting (iii) for the moment, it might be unhelpful to be told that in addition to regarding X I am regarding it *attentively*. Suppose we were willing to grant — which we aren't — that this means that regarding X attentively doesn't "break out" into regarding X and attention. Even then, it might still be helpful to be told that in addition to doing something attentively, I am *regarding X* attentively.

So Repaired Ryle (if not Ryle) is in the clear. The adverbial theory of heed is safe.

What's the relation between consciousness and heed? We could either regard it as identical to heed (with Ryle's (f)) or as the basis of heed (with Repaired Ryle's (d)). Either way, so there's no need for thinking of consciousness as essentially inner, with Place.

3. Place's positive view

For our final issue, we can ask what the heck Place's position *is*, and why he endorses it.

The discussion is very hard to interpret, but my best guess is the view is something like this. Suppose I see some garlic:

- p) Heeding the garlic is a pair of activities:
 - H1: an activity of internally changing oneself so as to increase the excellence of one's dispositions to react to the garlic—chopping it, say AND
 - H2: an internal activity which is the categorical basis of the disposition and which is similar to the activity of visualizing garlic
- q) Consciousness “as of” the garlic = H2 = being conscious of the sensation of garlic = having the sensation of garlic = “garlicky' conscious activity” or “consciousnizing garlickily” (Consciousnizing can be thought of as a sort of baseline activity I'm engaging in whenever I'm conscious. Sensation and (the inner part of) perception amount to, as it were, involuntary modifications in the manner in which I am consciousnizing.)
- r) Heedful chopping of garlic can be thought of chopping garlic while heeding perceived features that are relevant to the success of one's chopping. Chopping garlic itself can be thought of as a mere behavior with consciousness as of garlic as a part, rather than fully always (with Repaired Ryle) or sometimes (with Ryle) conscious.

The case for the view is something like the following:

- i. Heedfulness isn't in general a way of performing actions, but an action in its own right (By the alleged refutation of the adverbial view)
- ii. Namely, at least: heeding X = internally changing oneself so as to increase the excellence of one's dispositions to react to X; that's part H1 of (p) (Common coin among those rejecting the adverbial theory)
- iii. How then is consciousness of X related to heeding X? A mere disposition to heed X?
- iv. No, for a mix of crappy reasons and somewhat better reasons, the best of which is that having a disposition is not like something but being conscious of a tilted penny is like something (and what it is like is similar to what visualizing is like) — perhaps a sort of zombie argument
- v. Accordingly, consciousness of X is an activity which is the categorical basis of the disposition to heed X; that's (q)
- vi. Since heeding X entails consciousness of X, consciousness of X is part of heeding X; that's part H2 of (p)
- vii. Perceptual consciousness ends up being inner for who knows what reason — perhaps the analogy to visualizing? perhaps tradition?
- viii. I'm thinking Place would want to build sensations into consciousness—they can't be separate since the former entail the latter, and he seems to like that sort of argument, thus the adverbialism.

Our two questions at the top were:

- o why does Place call consciousness a *process*? Answer: H2 is consciousness and an activity (hence a process)
- o why does Place think consciousness, though inner, is inner in a way that escapes the Rylean dispositional reduction of important inner states to dispositions to behave? Answer: consciousness is inner because perceptual sensations are; it can't be dispositionally reduced because of the zombie-like argument; it can't be dismissed because it is the categorical basis of success, hence important.

Two final comments.

First: Is Place's view the doctrine of the ghost in the machine? Pretty much, yeah. Many, perhaps the most, important mental features present a very different first- and third-person epistemology. Although brain features are not *in principle* inaccessible, they have been in practice inaccessible for almost all of human history.

Place seems to wish to accommodate Ryle's banishment of the ghost, and asserts in the conclusion that he does not bring it back: but he does not back this assertion up. It is conceivable that he wavered in his understanding between the correct epistemological interpretation of Ryle's worry and an incorrect ontological interpretation, on which the game is saving physicalism: he thought this could be done by braining the ghost. That's right, but not germane.

Second: Place's view is not the phenomenal state conception, but it could be thought of as a *phenomenal activity* conception. Place's correct denial of doctrines (3) and (4) of the phenomenal state conception is paired with a mistaken acceptance of doctrines (1) and (2) as a result of his bad arguments against the adverbial theory of heed. Experiences therefore end up as inner activities modeled somehow on perceptual/sensational states: activities in the standard sense are purged from the domain of consciousness.

X. Summary

We have seen that the ultimate roots of the entrenchment of the phenomenal state conception of experience in our current milieu are:

- I. Place's bad arguments against the adverbial theory of heed
- II. Smart's confusion about what Place was saying
- III. Decades of ignoring issues not germane to the Argument from Revelation

(I) pushes Place's phenomenal activity conception into the literature. (II) converts it into the phenomenal state conception. And (III) keeps it there.